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ipelines to the north. Walls to the south. Between
President Trump’s issuance of a permit for the Keystone
XL pipeline crossing from Canada and his promise to
build “The Wall,” the politics of our national borders
rarely have been in as much turmoil as they are today. And as
with any infrastructure project, environmental policy has been
deeply in play all the way. But the environmental law of the
borders might surprise you. Indeed, arguably there isn’t any for
these two projects.
Let’s start at the top. Reversing the Obama administration’s position, in March 2017 the State Department issued
a permit to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., authorizing TransCanada to construct, connect, operate, and maintain
pipeline facilities at the U.S.–Canadian border in Phillips
County, Montana, to import crude oil. See U.S. Dep’t of
State, Presidential Permit (Mar. 24, 2017), available at https://
keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/
269322.pdf. All indications were that the Obama administration originally was moving in that direction as well, issuing
a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) environmental impact statement (EIS) in 2011 declaring the project
environmentally on par with alternatives. See U.S. Dep’t of
State, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Project (Aug. 26, 2011). However, although over
a dozen major pipelines cross the border with Canada—and
over 100 major oil, natural gas, and electric transmission
lines cross our northern and southern borders—the Keystone XL pipeline took on a symbolic, if not toxic, proile,
and the Obama administration slowed down its process. The
State Department eventually issued a supplemental EIS in
January 2014 to update its environmental assessment and
tee up a inal permit decision. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Final
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the
Keystone XL Project (Jan. 2014) (2014 XL FSEIS). Environmental interest group objections, centered around climate
change impacts, grew even louder in volume. Ultimately,
President Obama announced his agreement with Secretary
of State John Kerry’s decision to deny the permit. See U.S.
Dep’t of State, Keystone XL Pipeline Determination (Nov.
6, 2015), available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2015/11/249249.htm.
When the Trump administration so quickly into its tenure reversed that decision, environmental interest groups
cried foul and immediately brought suit. See Indigenous Envtl.
Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv-00029-BMM (D.
Mont., complaint iled Mar. 27, 2017); Northern Plains Res.
Council v. Shannon, No. 4:17-cv-00031-BMM (D. Mont., complaint iled Mar. 30, 2017). Like any typical infrastructure
project permit embroiled in such controversy, NEPA and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) play leading roles in the lawsuits, especially given that the Trump administration prepared
no new or supplemental EIS or ESA determinations. But this
is not your typical infrastructure project permit.
To begin with, the State Department issued a presidential
NR&E Summer 2017
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permit. Presidents long have taken the position that their
authority over foreign relations empowers them to permit
or deny border-crossing infrastructure. A complex web of
executive orders and agency rules and guidance governs the
presidential permit process, with two executive orders being
of central importance to oil pipelines. President Johnson in
1968 issued Executive Order 11423 to designate the Department of State as the agency administering the presidential
permits program for speciied facilities including oil pipelines.
33 Fed. Reg. 11,741 (Aug 16, 1968). Executive Order 11423
references no speciic constitutional or statutory authority,
asserting instead that “proper conduct of the foreign relations
of the United States requires that executive permission be
obtained for the construction and maintenance at the borders
of the United States of facilities connecting the United States
with a foreign country.” Id. In 2004, President George W.
Bush amended Executive Order 11423 with Executive Order
13337, which requires the State Department to issue a presidential permit “if the Secretary of State inds that issuance
of a permit to the applicant would serve the national interest.” 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299, 25,300 (Apr. 30, 2004). Notably, a
different set of executive orders covers natural gas pipelines
and electric transmission lines, designating other agencies as
the permit administrators, and federal legislation also governs
those facilities, whereas no federal statute has been enacted
governing oil pipeline siting, much less pipeline border crossings. See generally Cong. Res. Serv., Presidential Permits for
Border Crossing Energy Facilities, CRS R43261 (Oct. 29,
2013).
On their face, executive orders for oil pipelines describe
what looks like a routine infrastructure permitting process,
complete with interagency coordination. Indeed, although
the executive orders do not mention NEPA or the ESA, the
State Department conducts what it describes as a “NEPA consistent review” of permit applications, which includes review
“consistent with” the ESA and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). See 2014 XL FSEIS, at 7; see also U.S. Dep’t
State, Environmental Reviews for Presidential Permitting, https://
www.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/reviews/index.htm. By “consistent
with,” however, the State Department means not required by.
The reality of presidential permits for oil pipelines is
that they are presidential permits. The president issues them
through the State Department, but Executive Order 13337
explicitly provides that the president retains the authority to
issue a inal decision on whether or not to issue the presidential permit. 69 Fed. Reg. 25,299, 25,300. There is sparse case
law on the legal implications of this structure. One court has
held that nothing about the State Department’s role in the
presidential permit process changes the presidential character of the action, thus insulating State Department’s actions
from the requirements of NEPA, the ESA, and the NHPA.
See Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1081 (D.S.D. 2009). By contrast, another
court held that, while the president’s exercise of permitting
power is constitutional, the executive order’s delegation of
the permitting evaluation function to the State Department
subjects the agency to judicial review of its NEPA compliance. See Sierra Club v. Clinton, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157
(D. Minn. 2010). Under that reasoning, it is not clear what
would happen if a court deems the State Department’s EIS
deicient under NEPA but the president nonetheless issues
a border crossing permit under the retained “inal decision”
NR&E Summer 2017

authority. Also, presumably the president could nullify the
effect of the court’s decision by withdrawing delegation of the
State Department’s permitting functions for any particular
permit.
The lawsuits challenging President Trump’s permit reassert
the claim that the presidential permit is unconstitutional and,
if not, that the State Department’s actions are subject to the
ESA, NEPA, and other environmental statutes. Yet, while dozens of other federal and state environmental programs could
apply to the pipeline after it crosses the border, the law as it
stands now is that there may be no environmental law of oil
pipeline border crossings.
Looking to the south, one inds an equally convoluted legal
story leading to the prospect of no environmental law governing President Trump’s proposed border wall. The irst step in
that direction came when Congress in 1996 directed the U.S.
attorney general to “install additional physical barriers and
roads . . . in the vicinity of the United States border to deter
illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United
States.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit.
I, § 102, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–554 (codiied as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1103 note). IIRIRA authorized the attorney general
to waive the provisions of the ESA and NEPA to the extent
“necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers
and roads” at the border. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note. Notwithstanding that construction of improvements to the initial stretch of
border fence in San Diego had slowed because of conlict with
the California Coastal Commission, the attorney general opted
to have the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection comply
with NEPA and the ESA.
With the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security and consolidation of various authorities into its
jurisdiction in response to growing concern about border
security, Congress in 2005 amended Section 102 of IIRIRA
to grant to the Secretary of Homeland Security authority to waive “all legal requirements such Secretary, in such
Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure
expeditious construction of the barriers and roads.” REAL
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 102, 119
Stat. 231, 306 (emphasis added). Note the “all” preceding
“legal requirements”—Congress plainly intended the REAL
ID Act waiver to extend far beyond the ESA and NEPA, to
authorize waiver of any federal, state, or local legislation. See
H. Rep. 109-72 at 171 (2005). The provision also precludes
all judicial review of a waiver except for claims alleging a
constitutional violation. REAL ID Act § 102(c)(2). Appeals
from a district court’s resolution of such constitutional challenges are limited to certiorari review by the Supreme Court.
Id. § 102(c)(2)(A).
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff irst exercised the REAL ID Act’s broad waiver authority when
environmental interest groups sued to stop the San Diego portion of the fence by challenging the agency’s NEPA EIS and
ESA determinations. See 70 Fed. Reg. 55,622 (Sept. 22, 2005);
72 Fed. Reg. 2535 (Jan. 19, 2007). After the waiver, the court
rejected arguments that the waiver provision is an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the president because it
lacks “intelligible principles” to guide the agency’s decision.
Save Our Heritage Organization v. Gonzales, 533 F. Supp. 2d 58
(D.D.C. 2008). The environmental groups did not appeal the
decision.
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Secretary Chertoff invoked the power again in 2007 to
waive a long list of federal, state, and local laws to facilitate construction of fencing along the Arizona border. See
72 Fed. Reg. 60,870 (Oct. 26, 2007). Environmental interest
groups had challenged the Arizona fence project on a variety
of grounds, and the federal district court issued a temporary
restraining order. The secretary responded with the waiver.
The court quickly vacated the temporary restraining order and
dismissed claims that Section 102’s grant of waiver authority
violated separation of powers and other constitutional bounds.
The court ruled that the waiver provision is not equivalent
to the power to amend or repeal duly enacted laws, that it
is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the executive branch given the suficient statutory principle
that the waiver be “necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads,” and that the construction of
the border fence pertains to both foreign affairs and immigration control—areas over which the president traditionally
exercises independent constitutional authority. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment. Secretary Chertoff used the waiver again in 2008 for a 450-mile
stretch spanning all four border states. See 73 Fed. Reg. 18,294
(Apr. 3, 2008). A lawsuit challenging this massive waiver was
dismissed on grounds similar to the Defenders of Wildlife decision, with no appeal taken. See Cnty. of El Paso v. Chertoff, No.
EP-08-CA-196 FM, 2008 WL 4372693 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29,
2008).
The REAL ID Act waiver authority has not been used
again since 2008, but neither has the REAL ID Act waiver
provision been touched. The upshot is that while all environmental laws could apply to President Trump’s proposed wall
along our border with Mexico, his administration appears
likely to exercise the waiver power to assert that there is no
environmental law of the wall.
Energy security and border security are important public
policy goals, and it is understandable that the president and
Congress would wish that no unreasonable obstacles stand in
the way of achieving them. At a time when the growing concentration of power in the executive has raised substantial
concern, however, the presidential permit and the REAL ID
Act waiver are likely to attract continuing scrutiny and controversy for how much discretion they give the president over
deeming what is and is not an unreasonable obstacle. Ironically, whereas many members of Congress are among the most
vocal critics of growing executive branch power, Congress has
done nothing to check the presidential permit program for
oil pipelines and actually created the apparently unbounded
waiver power of the REAL ID Act. Opponents of both regimes
have thus far made little headway, albeit with only in a handful of district court opinions and one denial of certiorari on the
books. With litigation already ensuing over the Keystone XL
permit, and any exercise of waiver for more border wall likely
to attract a lawsuit in an instant, it looks like the courts are
not inished yet.
Mr. Ruhl is the David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law at
Vanderbilt University Law School in Nashville, Tennessee, and a member
of the editorial board of Natural Resources & Environment. He may be
reached at jb.ruhl@vanderbilt.edu.
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Jury Trials under
Environmental Statutes
Douglas A. Henderson and Justin T. Wong

U

nder the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Clean Air
Act, and other environmental statutes, when and on
what issues is a plaintiff—or defendant—entitled to
a jury trial? However straightforward this question
might sound, it triggers a range of challenging constitutional
construction and statutory interpretation issues, often so
blurred that parties simply agree to a bench trial.
As for the constitutional requirements, the Seventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “in Suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”
With respect to environmental cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412 (1987), is the
touchstone opinion applying the right to trial by jury articulated by the Seventh Amendment to the CWA and other
environmental statutes.
In a decision by Justice William Brennan, the Tull Court
examined whether a party—in this case, the defendant—had a
right to a jury trial on both liability and penalties in an action
under the CWA. As for the facts, a landowner placed ill material at various locations but contended the ill had not been
placed in jurisdictional “wetlands.” Although the U.S. Department of Justice conceded there were triable issues of fact on
whether such areas were jurisdictional wetlands, the trial court
denied the defendant’s request for a jury trial.
In Tull, the Supreme Court—after irst determining that
the CWA did not itself provide a jury trial right—concluded
the Seventh Amendment provided a jury trial right for “those
actions that are analogous to ‘Suits at Common law.’” 481
U.S. at 417. Working from this premise, the Court developed
a two-part test to make this determination. First, in evaluating whether a right to jury trial is required, the statutory action
must be compared to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and
equity. The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies to
those statutory rights that are analogous to common law causes
of actions decided by English law courts. Second, the remedy
sought must be examined to determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature, because only legal actions are entitled to
a jury trial. After a lengthy historical analysis of English and
Colonial common law actions, the Supreme Court held that
a right to a jury trial exists to determine liability under the
CWA, but not the amount of penalties or other remedies, if
any, which are determined by the court.
In Tull, although the United States was the plaintiff opposing a jury trial, the identity of a plaintiff does not change the
jury trial analysis. In a North Carolina case, the trial court
explained that as far as the right to a jury trial is concerned,
private plaintiffs seeking civil penalties in a citizens’ suit are
no different from the government itself so asserting in a lawsuit. N.C. Envtl. Justice Network v. Taylor, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 177773, at *7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2014). At the same
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